The paradoxes of risk management in the banking sector by LIM, Chu Yeong et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Accountancy School of Accountancy
1-2017
The paradoxes of risk management in the banking
sector
Chu Yeong LIM
Singapore Institute of Technology
Margaret WOODS
Aston University
Christopher HUMPHREY
University of Manchester
Jean Lin SEOW
Singapore Management University, jeanseow@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.09.002
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research_all
Part of the Accounting Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LIM, Chu Yeong; WOODS, Margaret; HUMPHREY, Christopher; and SEOW, Jean Lin. The paradoxes of risk management in the
banking sector. (2017). British Accounting Review. 49, (1), 75-90. Research Collection School of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research_all/2
The paradoxes of risk management in the banking sector
Chu Yeong Lim a, *, 1, Margaret Woods b, Christopher Humphrey c,
Jean Lin Seow d, 1
a Singapore Institute of Technology, 10 Dover Drive, Singapore 138683, Singapore
b Aston Business School, Aston University, Aston Express Way, Birmingham B4 7ET, United Kingdom
c Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom
d School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, 60 Stamford Road, Singapore 178900, Singapore
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 31 December 2014
Received in revised form 8 September 2016
Accepted 14 September 2016
Available online 27 September 2016
Keywords:
Risk management
Paradox theory
Power imbalance
Regulation
Behavioural
Three lines of defence
a b s t r a c t
This paper uses empirical evidence to examine the operational dynamics and paradoxical
nature of risk management systems in the banking sector. It demonstrates how a core
paradox of market versus regulatory demands and an accompanying variety of perfor-
mance, learning and belonging paradoxes underlie evident tensions in the interaction
between front and back ofﬁce staff in banks. Organisational responses to such paradoxes
are found to range from passive to proactive, reﬂecting differing organisational, depart-
mental and individual risk culture(s), and performance management systems. Nonethe-
less, a common feature of regulatory initiatives designed to secure a more structurally
independent risk management function is that they have failed to rectify a critical
imbalance of power - with the back ofﬁce control functions continuing to be dominated by
front ofﬁce trading and investment functions. Ultimately, viewing the 'core' of risk man-
agement systems as a series of connected paradoxes rather than a set of assured, robust
practices, requires a fundamental switch in emphasis away from a normative, standards-
based approach to risk management to one which gives greater recognition to its
behavioural dimensions.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In commenting on the global ﬁnancial crisis, academics, regulators, banking supervisors and practitioners all identify
shortcomings in corporate governance and risk management as key causes (see, for example, Bernanke, 2008; FSA, 2009;
Financial Stability Institute, 2015; Magnan & Markarian, 2011; OECD., 2009; Power, 2011). While the strength - and
perceived effectiveness - of risk management practice is suggested as being dependent upon underlying risk cultures (Arena,
Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2010; Mikes, 2009), and while the heterogeneity of risk management systems across organisations
continues to be emphasised (Arena et al., 2010;Mikes, 2009;Woods, 2011), detailed academic studies of practice, especially in
ﬁnancial services, remain rare but are still much needed (see Van der Stede, 2011). The importance of gaining a deeper,
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institutional level knowledge of riskmanagement practice has been heightened by post-crisis calls for practice improvements
that cannot easily be addressed in the absence of such detailed knowledge.
Risk management systems in banking are underpinned by regulatory pressure to ensure that risk and compliance func-
tions, supported by internal audit, are independent of revenue generating functions. Organisational independence for risk
managers, however, raises questions about how different functions interact, and the extent to which risk management staff
are able to exercise inﬂuence and control over the risk taking behaviour of corporate bankers. This paper seeks to shed light on
some of the interactive/behavioural dimensions of risk management which Power (2009) considers to have been under-
emphasised. It is also a direct response to Kaplan's (2011, p. 374) call to address the question of “what is the relationship
between professional risk managers and line management”. We explore the interconnections between organisational
structures, management controls and incentive systems, and following Rousseau's (1985) approach, take the view that it
cannot be assumed that concepts such as risk are commonly deﬁned and uniformly understood within an organisation.
Using interview data, the paper explores differing staff viewpoints of risk management and internal control practices in
the banking sector and the strategic signiﬁcance and degree of resolution of such differences in practice - issues that, to date,
have largely been ignored in the literature. Our analysis of the interaction between the revenue generating and risk and
control functions conﬁrms high proﬁle declarations by ﬁnancial services regulators of an “imbalance between the stature and
resources allocated to ﬁrms' revenue generating businesses and those afforded to the risk and control functions.” (Senior
Supervisors Group, 2009, p.22). Gendron, Brivot, and Guenin-Paracini (2016) found that board members tend to excuse
risk management failings, protecting and preserving the legitimacy and credibility of the risk management ‘core’ whilst over-
simplifying underlying practice. We conclude that such protection of risk management systems clouds the fact that their
formal structures are less important than the issue of an imbalance of power; consequently, risks may not be as well
controlled as such systems might suggest.
Conceptually, the paper extends Gendron et al. (2016) analysis and understanding of risk management practices by
drawing on the framework of paradox theory (Quinn & Cameron, 1988). While paradox theory has been extensively studied
and developedwithin the organisational studies literature, our approach is novel in applying such a theoretical framing to the
study of risk management. Paradox is deﬁned as “contradictory yet inter-related elements that exist simultaneously and
persist over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382) and paradox theory explores how organisations respond to, and seek to
manage, the tensions which arise when simultaneously pursuing competing objectives (Jarzablowski, Le& Van de Ven, 2013;
Lewis, 2000; Smith& Lewis, 2011). Banks face a paradox of objectives in respect of market versus regulatory demands, as was
clearly demonstrated by the global ﬁnancial crisis ewith the Turner Review describing how the search for a “ferocious” yield
by investors led to ﬁnancial innovation and the creation of complex products whose risks were poorly understood (FSA,
2009). Financial returns were seen as having taken precedence over risk management.
Empirically, we draw on thirteen interviews with front and back ofﬁce risk management staff working in the Singapore
ofﬁces of ten global ﬁnancial institutions and two regulatory bodies, to develop insight and understanding of the organ-
isational signiﬁcance of the competing demands of generating proﬁts while remaining compliant with regulatory risk re-
quirements. Singapore provides a unique setting for risk management research in a global context as it is a major centre for
trade in commodity, foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives and in 2013 Singapore handled 40% of all Asian OTC
derivatives trades (Davies& Grant, 2013). Such a global standing was helpful as it meant we could workwith banks of varying
geographical origin (including the US, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East).
Building on the existing literature, we illustrate how a core ‘market-regulatory’ paradox stimulates more operationally
speciﬁc paradoxes and tensions which affect the organisation of risk management systems, the measurement of staff per-
formance and staff allegiances to the risk culture. Our categorisation of types of paradoxes matches closely the paradoxes of
organising, performing, belonging and learning identiﬁed by Lewis (2000) and Luscher and Lewis (2008).2 We ﬁnd the core
‘market-regulatory’ paradox to be a common feature across all the ﬁnancial institutions studied, but observe operational
variations in the risk management responses that reﬂect differences in organisational and departmental risk culture(s),
performance incentive systems and personal risk actor proﬁles. Responses range from being largely passive in nature e “we
do what is needed to make the systemwork” e to proactive searches for ways to resolve the paradoxes, and our observations
align with the suggested acceptance versus resolution responses discussed by Smith and Lewis (2011).
Regardless of the responses, however, the fundamental paradox of market versus regulatory demands remains in place,
creating persistent challenges for risk managers. We conclude that there are strong analytical grounds for arguing that
existing models of risk management are fundamentally ﬂawed. Regulation, and stylised risk management systems have, to
date, been largely unsuccessful in restraining/redressing the imbalance of power between ‘revenue generating’ and ‘risk and
control’ staff. We suggest that attention should therefore shift towards understanding better the nature and signiﬁcance of
such power differentials (i.e., knowing where the power lies, how it is exercised and with what consequences). The analytical
priority has tomove away from a reliance on standardised riskmanagement systems to a better understanding of how people
accommodate and live with the day-to-day tensions and contradictions of ‘risk managed’ organisations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on risk management in
ﬁnancial institutions, while section 3 outlines our theoretical framework. Section 4 details the research context and method,
and section 5 presents our empirical ﬁndings. Discussion of our key ﬁndings and a conclusion complete the paper.
2 These concepts are explained in the theoretical framework section of the paper.
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2. Literature review
As already noted, in responding to the global ﬁnancial crisis, politicians (G20, 2008; OECD., 2009), regulators (Basel, 2010;
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2010; Senior Supervisors Group, 2009) and practitioners (KPMG., 2011; PwC,
2012) have all questioned risk management practice within the banking sector and continue to argue the case for change.
Criticism of riskmanagement has also extended to the academic literature. Power (2011) highlighted the illusion of control
that can result from extensive formalised guidance and standards which encourage a focus on regulatory compliance. The
emphasis on quantiﬁcation, standardization and legitimation (De Bondt, 2010) can also be criticised for encouraging a ‘risk
management by numbers’ mentality (Mikes, 2009) and there have been strong increasing calls for a broader-based under-
standing of the relationship/behavioural dimensions of risk management (De Bondt, 2010). The interconnectedness and
complexity of both risk exposures and control systems in organisations, or what Vit (2013) refers to as the ‘non-economic
logics’ that are required to govern and manage risk, however, have often been neglected by researchers. This is perhaps
surprising given that Kloman (1990), writing about risk management a quarter of a century ago, recognised the need to
understand the complex interrelationships that exist in everything we do. The signiﬁcance of appreciating the behavioural
dimensions of risk management was highlighted by Power (2009), who stressed that failure to consider interactions within
and between organisational actors can lead to the risk management of nothing.
Regulators have similarly acknowledged the need for a better understanding of how risk management staff interact with
business line managers and the potential governance implications of such interactions. A Senior Supervisors Group report
(2009, p.38) concluded that “increased co-ordination and interaction between the risk management function and the
business lines needs to be … ingrained into the corporate culture if the beneﬁts are to be sustainable and effective.” These
comments echoed those of the Institute of International Finance (2008) which declared that “… development of a ‘risk
culture’ throughout the ﬁrm is perhaps the most fundamental tool for effective risk management” (IIF, 2008).
Research into the behavioural dimensions of risk management needs to take into account the historical context within
which risk management systems in the banking sector have developed, at both the international (e.g., through Basel Regu-
lations) and national level (e.g., as speciﬁed by local supervisory authorities) e and the impact that such regulations have had
on the design of internal risk management systems.
The original international rules, framed under the Basel I Accord (Basel, 1988) focused on deﬁning bank capital and
establishing risk-based rules for capital adequacy. Growing complexity within ﬁnancial services, combined with a series of
ﬁnancial scandals in the mid 1990's, such as Daiwa Bank (1995), Barings (1995), and Sumitomo (1995), however, shifted the
focus from capital adequacy to supervisory oversight and review of internal control systems. Concerned ﬁnance ministers of
the G7 group of countries called for more effective supervision of bank risk taking and in response the Basel Committee
published guidelines for internal control in banking organisations (Basel, 1998). A key element of the guidelines was Principle
6 - a requirement for banks to segregate the duties of those involved in proﬁt generation (front ofﬁce) from those responsible
for control and compliance (back ofﬁce). This was complemented by Principle 11 of the guidelines which deﬁned the role of
internal audit as reviewing the internal control system and reporting to senior management and/or Board of Directors on the
outcome of that review. Independence of the control function and internal audit was thus a central tenet of the guidelines,
and resulted in three distinct functional groups within banks e the front ofﬁce, risk and control, and internal audit.
These groupings have come to form the basis of the ‘three lines of defence’ (TLOD) model of risk management, which
identiﬁes three categories of staff as holding responsibility for risk management. The ﬁrst ‘line of defence’ is the front ofﬁce
staff. The central risk management function, which establishes the rules and systems to control risk taking, is the second ‘line
of defence’. The third ‘line of defence’ is internal audit, which is responsible for testing control effectiveness and advising
senior executives accordingly.
The TLODmodel prescribes a distinct role for independent risk and internal audit functions, and thus provides a structural
framework for compliance with the Basel Committee guidelines on internal control. Its general historical origins, possibly
deriving from sport or the military remain unclear (Davies, 2013), but its adoption by banks appears to have been driven by its
capacity to represent a way of operationalising, and legitimising, the regulatory requirement to split the front and back ofﬁce
functions. In this regard, the TLOD model was recommended to banks as a useful template by the UK's Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in 2003 (Davies, 2013). Some years later, a UK consultation paper (FSA, 2010) on improving operational risk
management in ﬁnancial institutions referenced the widespread use of the model and its particular merits when supported
by a strong risk culture.
At an international level, use of the TLOD approach has been endorsed in publications of the Basel Committee on Banking
Regulation (Basel, 2011, 2012). Additional, unequivocal support for TLOD came from the USA in 2014 when the Ofﬁce of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued formal guidelines for a bank's governance framework requiring the establishment
of the three component elements (lines of defence): front ofﬁce, independent risk management and internal audit (OCC.,
2014). Post crisis, therefore, regulatory support for the TLOD not only persists, but its role in risk management is now
ﬁrmly established, with its use in the banking sector being described as “ubiquitous” (Davies, 2013).
In awider context the TLODmodel was endorsed by the European Confederation of Institutes for Internal Auditing in 2012
(ECIIA, 2012), which described it as essential for establishing clearly-structured corporate governance systems. Less than a
year later the Institute of Internal Auditors issued a position paper that argued that the TLOD model “can enhance clarity
regarding risks and controls and help improve the effectiveness of risk management systems” (IIA, 2013, p.3). Since then, the
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IIA has strongly promoted the model on the global stage, with its use being extended beyond ﬁnancial services and into all
types of business (see, for example, COSO, 2015).
Nonetheless, the TLODmodel has been criticised for its failure to reﬂect the organisational challenges of risk management
practice (Power, Ashby,& Palermo, 2014). At its simplest, this is illustrated by the fact that the TLODmodel does not recognise
the potential additional lines of defence that may be enacted by the Board of Directors, external auditors and regulators
(Power et al., 2014; FSI, 2015). Other fundamental organisational issues which illustrate its weaknesses include problems of
conﬂict between risk responsibility and proﬁt generation in the ﬁrst line of defence, a lack of organisational independence,
knowledge and expertise in the second line of defence/control function, and inadequate risk oversight by internal audit - the
third line of defence (for more discussion, see FSI, 2015). Such criticisms suggest a need to look beyond the mere structure of
TLOD - and to focus more on the interactions between each of the three lines of defence, if we are to gain a better under-
standing of risk management practice.
The relationship between staff in and across the different lines of defence, including the relative power exercised by front
and back ofﬁce staff can be viewed as institutionally speciﬁc, reﬂecting particular business histories and associated inﬂuences
on codes of management behaviour, morality and the local understanding of risks (Arena et al., 2010). Ashby, Sharma and
McDonnell's (2003) study of ﬁnancial institutions identiﬁed a potential for conﬂict arising out of a lack of communication
between the respective parties, whileMikes (2009) similarly suggested that using riskmanagement for organisational control
can meet with resistance. More speciﬁcally, Power et al. (2014) found examples of tensions between the ﬁrst and second lines
of defence, suggesting that whilst a certain degree of conﬂict is healthy as it implies a “challenging” risk function, there is a
delicate balance to be sought. Excessive challenge can be alienating to business line staff, but excessive friendliness by the risk
management staff may imply weak controls and staff who “can become captured and end up in bedwith the business” (Power
et al., 2014, p. 28). One possible explanation for such tensions might lie in different attitudes to risk across front and back
ofﬁce staff. Wahlstrom (2009), for instance, found core differences in the frames of reference used by the two groups to
interpret risks that also inﬂuenced their respective attitudes to the usefulness of external Basel II banking regulations.
Problems arising from different attitudes to risk may be further compounded by issues surrounding the relative status of
risk management staff vis-a-vis traders or corporate bankers. In research predating the global ﬁnancial crisis, Willman,
Creevy, Nicholson, and Soane (2002) found that traders’ strong sense of autonomy affected the way in which risk taking
was managed, with increased autonomy creating increased challenges for the control function. The £3.7 billion of trading
losses incurred by Societe Generale in 2008 were blamed on a control function that lacked the power to exercise “critical
scrutiny” (Societe Generale, 2008) and thus facilitated the fraud. In a similar vein, a report by the SEC into failures at Bear
Stearns, concluded that the proximity of risk managers to traders was indicative of a lack of independence (SEC, 2008).
A study by Stein (2002) suggested that the organisational structure of the risk management function inﬂuenced the extent
towhich risk informationwas shared betweenmanagement and the business lines. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) tested this idea
further in a large scale analysis of the signiﬁcance of risk management in US-based bank holding companies (BHC's) over the
period 1995e2010. Using an index to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function, the authors
tested the hypothesis that institutions with a strong and independent risk function should, ceteris paribus, have lower tail
risk. They concluded that BHC's with stronger pre-crisis risk management functions had lower tail risks during crisis years,
but there was no association between risk management independence and tail risk in non-crisis years. Research by Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) also found that risk taking was linked to the status of the risk management function.
Using the senior risk manager's share of the total compensation paid to the ﬁve most senior bank executives as a proxy for
their power, Keys et al. (2009) showed that the default rates on mortgage loans were lower in those banks where the risk
manager's power was higher.
In summary, research evidence to date suggests that in complying with regulation by implementing the TLOD model,
banks face challenges surrounding theway inwhich risks are respectively understood by line and riskmanagement staff, how
those risks are communicated across the TLOD, and the degree of power and inﬂuence granted to, and exercised by, the risk
management function. Whilst the TLOD model is widely used by ﬁnancial institutions, we still know relatively little about
how it is operationalized in practice and how conﬂicts, tensions and basic communication between the different levels of
defence are managed. Paradox theory was developed as away of describing and explaining how entities deal with competing
demands and objectives (Smith & Lewis, 2011) and it is used in this study to discuss the relationship between risk and line
management staff in banks, providing detailed examples of conﬂicts between the two groups, and analysing how organi-
sations and their staff respond to such conﬂicts. The next section of this paper outlines this theoretical framework in more
depth.
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Types of paradox
The literature on paradox theory suggests the existence of four different types of paradox: namely, the paradoxes of
organising, performing, belonging and learning (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Lewis, 2000) that may be found at different levels
within an organisation. The organising paradox is concerned with processes at the entity level, whereas the paradoxes of
performing and belonging relate to speciﬁc tensions faced by individuals at all levels across the entity. The paradox of per-
forming concerns the goals that individuals are required to meet, and the paradox of belonging refers to tensions between an
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individual employee's loyalties and values and the groups and group values with which he/she may be required to conform
(Smith & Lewis, 2011).
At the entity level, the organising paradox is observedwhen an entity seeks to create overall systems tomanage conﬂicting
goals and tensions between different parts of the same organisation (Lewis, 2000). The aim is to create a coherent and in-
tegrated whole which is structured in a way that ensures overall organisational goals are achieved. Jarzabkowski et al. (2013)
illustrate the organising paradox through a case study of a telecommunications company faced with two distinct units that
have conﬂicting objectives. One division is market focused, centred onmeeting the requirements for high quality, competitive
services; another division does not have direct market contact, and is constrained by the need to comply with various reg-
ulatory demands. Many organisations are subject to extensive regulation, or public oversight. For example, those involved in
environmentally sensitive activities such as oil exploration must attempt to balance the conﬂicting interests of the envi-
ronmentalists with those of their shareholders, for whom proﬁt is the presumed primary objective. Addressing and
respecting such concerns whilst, at the same time, generating satisfactory investment returns for shareholders represents an
organising paradox.
The literature also suggests that within an entity individual managers may face paradoxes in their work as they try to deal
with contradictory performance demands and expectations from internal and external stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston,
1995). The performing paradox, for example, reﬂects the contradictions of being required to be both productive and creative,
efﬁcient and effective, or to delegate but also to control. Luscher and Lewis (2008) give an example of the Lego Company in
which managers are confronted with the challenges of being in charge and yet having to delegate decisions to others. In the
context of risk management, performing paradoxes may arise, or be aggravated by performance management and incentive
systems which encourage potentially contradictory behaviour. For example, if a back ofﬁce accountant is evaluated on the
basis of the speed at which a front ofﬁce trade is recorded, then this search for speedmay reduce their capacity to evaluate the
trading risk, or complete the necessary regulatory compliance paperwork.
A paradox of belonging arises when individuals face a conﬂict between their personal and social identities in the work
place (Kreiner, Hollensbe,& Sheep, 2006). This problem is mademore acutewhen a person simultaneously belongs to several
teams, each with conﬂicting demands. An illustrative example here is the observed lack of trust and resulting anxieties of
managers working in both themanagement team and the production team (Luscher& Lewis, 2008). Such anxieties were seen
to reﬂect the managers ‘personal’ efforts to balance the different social identities (needs and values) of each different team as
well as their own personal identity. In earlier work, Pratt and Foreman (2000) suggested that individuals compartmentalise
each of their different social and individual identities, although Luscher and Lewis' (2008) observation implies that such
compartmentalisation may not work in cross-functional team settings where staff may be members of more than one
functional team.
The paradox of belonging may be useful in gaining a better understanding of risk management failures. At the macro level,
for example, a bank may face a paradox of belonging between its own internal risk culture and that of regulators. At a micro
level, the individual risk manager may see a mismatch between their own, personal risk preferences and the team or group's
risk culture. Any such paradoxes may mean that risks are not being managed in a uniformway across the bank, and may give
rise to conﬂict between individuals/groups with differing risk preferences. Such conﬂicts could undermine the effectiveness
of the risk management system.
The paradox of learning comes from contradictions between building on existing knowledge and creating new knowledge
(Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Examples from the literature include tensions between radical and incremental learning
(Smith & Lewis, 2011) and exploitation and exploration (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009) in relation to product development.
Creative disruption is another example of the learning paradox, in which organisations capitalize on and yet cannibalize their
existing product(s) (Christensen, 1997). Smith and Lewis (2011) argue that learning paradoxes emerge as systems change and
innovate, and this is useful for considering how managers deal with the tension between retaining old familiar ways of
managing risk versus the adoption of new and possibly controversial approaches. The paradox of learning is especially
relevant to risk management as techniques and practices evolve in response to new regulations and as new ﬁnancial products
are created to meet changing market demands.
All four forms of paradox may coexist, interact and cascade down through an organisation - from the organisational level,
through to functional and individual levels (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Luscher and Lewis (2008) found
the performing paradox to be intertwined with organising and belonging paradoxes, especially when managers belong to
different teams and face multiple reporting lines and performance targets. In the risk management context, multiple
reporting lines may serve to blur the lines of accountability, thus undermining the effectiveness of risk controls.
Jarzabkowski et al. (2013) suggest that as the paradoxes co-evolve, managers may change their responses, shifting from a
defensive standpoint that provides only “short-term relief” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) from prevailing paradoxes, in favour of
more active responses to try andmanage the paradox(es) over the longer term. Such shifts are said to be key to organisational
survival (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013), making the distinction between defensive and active responses highly signiﬁcant.
3.2. Responding to paradoxes
Paradoxes may remain latent, and even be unrecognised in an organisation, but if they become salient, and affect the
behaviour of organisational actors, then an organisational response is generated (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Alternative defensive
responses include splitting, suppressing, and projection.
C.Y. Lim et al. / The British Accounting Review 49 (2017) 75e90 79
Splitting involves separating the contradictory elements into different parts of the organisation, for example by setting up
different divisions. Suppressing involves placing priority on one element and allowing it to dominate over others, whilst a
projection response passes the blame for failure to achieve conﬂicting goals onto a third party, such as an external regulator.
None of these responses, however, eliminate the underlying paradox. Indeed, it has been argued that such tensions are often
not confronted directly (Smith & Lewis, 2011), and managers simply accept and ‘live with’ a paradox. In the literature,
accepting and adjusting behaviour is categorised as an active response only if the managers explicitly recognise the contra-
dictions (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) and try to manage them long term. Accepting involves identifying ways of balancing the
differing perspectives, but adjusting actively engages the competing parties in ﬁnding a solution to the tensions. A third, and
more sophisticated, response is that of transcendence in which the competing viewpoints that create the paradox are rein-
terpreted as interdependent elements rather than a paradox (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013).
Using the above delineated framework of paradox theory, the empirical evidence presented in section 5 examines the
different paradoxes in risk management systems and the differing ways in which such paradoxes are handled/managed.
Particular attention is given to the interaction of, and tensions between, market and regulatory priorities for the operation and
overall functional efﬁcacy of risk management. The market versus regulatory paradox occurs at the organisational level, and
cascades down to create tensions for individual staff within the banks in terms of their risk management role. Before pre-
senting the research evidence, however, we outline below our research method and site selection.
4. Research methods
4.1. Research context and data sources
Our chosen research site was Singapore which, according to the Bank for International Settlements was ranked in 2013 as
the largest foreign exchange trading centre in the Asia Paciﬁc region and the third largest globally. Singapore is also ranked as
the largest OTC interest rate derivatives centre in Asia Paciﬁc (excluding Japan). The scale of market opportunities offered by
Singapore has attracted awide range of international banks to the city and it is the riskmanagement staff in these institutions,
and the associated regulatory authorities, who are the focus of this research. The international banks in our study are subject
to local regulation by the Central Bank (Monetary Authority of Singapore) and the Singapore Stock Exchange, in addition to
international regulations under the Basel Capital Accord.
Table 1 details the geographic diversity of the institutions included in our study and the functional roles of interviewees
who included regulators, business development, credit risk, compliance, product control, operations risk and internal audit
staff.
Interviewees’ experience levels ranged from six months to twenty years. All interviews were conducted between August
2013 and May 2014. Of the ﬁfteen interviewees approached, thirteen responded positively. The high response rate perhaps
reﬂects the beneﬁts of researching in a co-operative Asian culture, but also of using personal contacts to initiate an intro-
duction.We acknowledge the limitations of this method of selection, and the potential bias that it might imply, but we believe
this risk has been mitigated by the fact that our study embraces a total of nine different organisations - seven ﬁnancial in-
stitutions with geographical origins ranging across Europe, Asia, the US and the Middle East, and two regulatory bodies (See
Table 1).
Clariﬁcation of the respective job titles that sit within the three lines of defence is helpful in understanding the nature of
the work done by the interviewees. The ﬁrst lines of defence, or front ofﬁce, includes asset managers, corporate bankers and
traders, all of whom seek to generate proﬁts by taking risks on behalf of the organisation and its clients.
Table 1
Details of interviewees.
Functional area Country and institution Interviewee code
Product Controller European Bank 5
European Bank 12
Regulator Asian Regulator 1
Asian Regulator 3
Credit Risk US Bank 2
US Bank 7
US Bank 8
Operations Risk US Bank 10
Internal Audit Asian Bank 6
Corporate Banking US Bank 9
Compliance Middle Eastern Bank 4
European Bank 13
Business Development US Asset Management 11
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The back ofﬁce (second line of defence) is comprised of the credit risk management, compliance, product/business
controller and operational risk departments. The credit risk manager evaluates the credit risks of potential borrowers and
approves/rejects loan applications. The compliance ofﬁcer ensures organisational compliance with the laws and regulations
of the jurisdiction(s) in which it operates. The product/business controller is responsible for the accounting and ﬁnancial
reports of the businesses, ensuring that the ﬁnancials are consistent with the accounting standards. The operational risk
ofﬁcer assesses the business processes to minimize the risks of loss from system inadequacies or failures. The third line of
defence, the internal audit function, typically has a direct reporting line to the senior management of the organisation and is
responsible for audits of both front and back ofﬁces.
A hybrid role, not explicitly recognisedwith the TLODmodel, is the function commonly termed business development. The
individual in charge of business development is responsible for the returns earned for the business by the front ofﬁce, but also
the day-to-daymanagement by back ofﬁce staff of the associated risks, including regulatory compliance. As such, the business
development manager straddles the ﬁrst and second lines of defence and the risk management paradox as they seek to
“balance contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p.
382).
4.2. Interview protocol
Each interview lasted 1e2 hours and two interviewers were present at each one to facilitate the researcher-participant
exchange and to validate the extensive notes taken on interviewee responses (serving as a valuable supplement to the
verbatim transcriptions of the audio content). We believe that the length of interviews helps to mitigate the relatively small
number undertaken. The interviews were semi-structured, incorporating open-ended questions about issues such as: the
relationship between staff in the ﬁrst and second lines of defence; ofﬁcial organisational mechanisms or responses that
existed (if any) to help resolve paradoxes and associated tensions; the relative power held by front and back ofﬁce staff; and
the organisational risk culture and performance incentive structures. Interviewees were also asked to provide speciﬁc ex-
amples/anecdotes to illustrate how risks were managed in practice. Whilst we allowed interviewees the opportunity to
express and develop a range of views, prompted by appropriate follow-up questions, we nonetheless ensured that the main
issues and research themes were satisfactorily covered.
All interview notes were written up within twenty four hours. A third researcher (not involved in the interview process)
subsequently reviewed the interview notes and acted as an independent commentator on the main themes and issues that
were identiﬁed.
4.3. Data analysis
To preserve conﬁdentiality, each of the thirteen interviewees was assigned a code number for data collation purposes and
information on the relevant codes was retained in a secure ﬁle. Analysis of the interview data took the form of a series of
iterative stages, using an interpretative line of enquiry similar to that described in Gendron et al. (2016). In the ﬁrst stage of
our analysis we sought to identify and classify the interviewees’ responses into the types of paradox identiﬁed and discussed
by previous researchers, namely organising, belonging, performing and learning. In mapping the individual and organisa-
tional responses to paradoxes against the categories suggested in the theoretical framework, we also sought to distinguish
whether responses were defensive or active in style (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). The example below
illustrates how the themes were linked back to the literature.
As a product controller, interviewee 12 is responsible for the accounting records for the trading transactions and activities
of the corporate bankers. Accounting for derivatives and other ﬁnancial assets is highly complex, and the subject of a much
revised and very lengthy international accounting standard (IAS39, now IFRS 9). The above quote relates to the accounting
regulations on revenue recognition and highlights the fact that the structuring of a loan (as determined by the corporate
banker) has implications for the accounting for the transaction, and the institution's balance sheet, which is also subject to
risk related regulation. Under the Basel regulations, the amount of capital that a bank must hold is directly linked to the risk
Example
“The Accounting Policy team works closely with the legal team, and they will look at various criteria in the terms of
the loan to see how much revenue can be recognised. It depends on the terms, whether there is risk-sharing. We
may take it off-balance sheet, or recognise in the balance sheet. We recognise the asset and liability of the loan, so if
we de-recognise, we take both the asset and liability out. Actually there has been an attempt in (the bank) to make
the balance sheet as lean as possible because it affects the risk rating. So a lot has been taken off-balance sheet.”
Interviewee 12: Product Controller, European Bank.
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levels of the assets held on its balance sheet, and so a “lean” balance sheet with fewer risky assets is more attractive as it
reduces capital requirements. The example clearly illustrates a paradox between arranging loans that might generate ‘good’
returns for the bank - but at possibly high risk - and structuring loans that, whilst offering lower returns, can be taken off-
balance sheet. We interpreted this as an example of the paradox of performing, which is deﬁned by Smith and Lewis
(2011) as stemming from a plurality of stakeholders and resulting in a number of competing strategies and goals. In the
above example, the product controller responded to the paradox by working to lower the institutional risk proﬁle and capital
requirement by taking assets and liabilities off the balance sheet. We classiﬁed this as an active response which also
demonstrated the recurrence of the same paradox across different levels: organisation, unit (risk management) and indi-
vidual (product controller). The next section reports our ﬁndings, categorised in accordance with the range of observed
paradoxes.
Our second stage of analysis involved reﬂecting on the organisational signiﬁcance of the paradoxes we identiﬁed and the
way in which they are responded to and managed. A key consideration here was the scope to consider the validity of the
assumptions underpinning the TLOD model and its contribution to securing ‘effective’ risk management.
5. Empirical ﬁndings
5.1. Risk management and the organising paradox
External factors have the capacity to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence a bank's business strategy. Regulators control bank risk taking
via rules on risk and capital measurement, inspection and supervisory oversight of internal control systems, and accounting
and reporting standards. Simultaneously, the ﬁnancial markets impose pressures on the banks to generate ‘acceptable’ in-
vestment returns whilst also demonstrating ‘reputable’ behaviour. Banks, therefore, face a paradox of organising in respect of
how to best structure themselves in a way that accommodates and manages the challenge of its market versus risk based
regulatory demands.
The paradox of organising was clearly expressed by a senior interviewee working in a European bank when discussing the
measurement and control of risk:
“Banks are in this for proﬁt-making. What incentive is there to put controls into their processes? Financial risk
(compensation to clients when things blow up) is pretty intangible. Even if they see some ﬁnancial risk, there is a lot of
opposition to respond to this. Front ofﬁce bankers will object and say it (controls, measures) impedes sales and upsets
clients. Management (of the bank) wonders what the purpose of doing it (controls, measures) is for.”
Interviewee 7 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
The highlighted scope for conﬂict between front and back ofﬁce reﬂects paradoxical objectives. Jarzabkowski et al. (2013)
used the term ‘splitting’ to characterise how a telecommunications company responded to a similar organising (market-
regulatory) paradox by dividing the company into two separate units (one customer-facing, the other regulatory-facing). As
already noted, in banks, the split between themarket-facing front ofﬁce and the regulatory-facing back ofﬁcewas an outcome
of the regulatory requirement for segregation of duties under Principle 6 of the Basel Framework for Internal Control: (Basel,
1998). The TLOD model which grew in popularity just a few years after the Basel framework was published, provided a
stylised response to the splitting of front and back ofﬁces, as it identiﬁed a way to get the front ofﬁce to take responsibility for
risk. The TLOD facilitated the creation of a rationalising structure of risk management, even though its effectiveness may be
open to question.
The impact of this response to the organisation paradox is illustrated in the following quote:
“In the old days, corporate bankers looked for a customer, sourced the deal, assessed the credit risk of the customer/
deal, and took on the risk of bad debt. Thus, they were careful to take on (only) good risks. The origination perspective
of loans is that it needs to measure the downside of loans for the corporate bankers. In the current construct, that link is
lost. The credit risk ofﬁcer role is separated from the corporate banker role. The credit risk ofﬁcer is the one to reject
loan applications with his/her performance tied to his/her credit assessment. The front ofﬁce is assessed solely on
revenues with little accountability for bad debts.”
Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
The sentence in italics implies that splitting means corporate bankers may no longer be concerned about the risk of the
loans they generate, particularly if their performance is revenue-focused. Despite being forced by regulation to split the
functions, our evidence suggests that banks have simply created a new paradox/tension around the interaction between the
front and back ofﬁces.
“This is the nature of the business. If front ofﬁce agrees with Compliance, then front ofﬁce has probably lost its edge and
is too conservative. But if Compliance agrees with front ofﬁce, then Compliance has conceded ground. A balance is
needed.”
Interviewee 7 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
The problem in practice is how to achieve such a desired balance, and this raises issues of compensation, performance
management, and organisational structure and culture. The TLOD model is reﬂected in the organisational structure within
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banks and assumes that staff in the ﬁrst line of defence (front ofﬁce) accept a degree of responsibility for managing risks.
Splitting does not, however, automatically grant power to the back ofﬁce over the front ofﬁce, and if incentives aremisaligned
then risk controllers may be unable to restrain the bankers' risk taking. The so-called ‘tone at the top’ of the bank can offer
guidance on attitudes to risk but such ‘ofﬁcial’ declarations are not always well understood:
“A European bank started the mantra: “it is not the results per se, but how you achieve results”. This seems to place
more emphasis on values, as a means to control the trading environment. However, it is not known howmanagement
values are being measured.”
Interviewee 5 (Product Controller).
Staff face a challenge regarding how to interpret management values, and regulators have sought to help by formulating
commentaries and guidelines on risk culture:
“An Asian Central bank has deﬁned four main areas of risk culture framework from the audit perspective including
infrastructure (tools and techniques), tone from the top, people/communications. The bank has adopted risk culture
measures such as management control awareness, ratings, repeat control issues, control self-assessment, response
time to issues, MIS (Management Information System) reporting, and measures of information ﬂows to management.
Still, ultimately risk culture is subjective and difﬁcult to measure. The key question to determine a ﬁrm's risk culture is:
at trade origination date, is the banker willing to walk away from the deal if it does not smell right, does not feel right?”
Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
The willingness of a banker to walk away from a deal depends upon his/her acceptance that responsibility for risk remains
part of their role. The splitting of functions, however, makes it easier for bankers to pass the risk responsibility back to the
second line of defence, even though the TLODmodel makes their personal responsibility clear. This potential to ‘pass the buck’
creates tensions across the functional divide. One senior manager in a European bank commented:
“There is tension everywhere! But what is most documented is the front vs. back ofﬁce tension.”
Interviewee 13 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
This viewpoint was reiterated by manager in a US bank:
“The front ofﬁce sales people are driven by sales revenue targets, while the back ofﬁce compliance people need tomake
sure checklists are complied with and product control functions are focused on meeting audit requirements.”
Interviewee 8 (Credit Risk Manager).
In light of the existing literature (e.g., see Wahlstrom, 2009) it might be expected that those working in the front and back
ofﬁces may also differ in their respective attitudes to risk. This was conﬁrmed by an interviewee from corporate banking:
“Sales and trading ﬂoor people have certain personalities. This is done through recruitment e only certain types get
recruited for these jobs. Very different from back ofﬁce people, like product controllers, who normally have audit
backgrounds and are more conservative …. back ofﬁce people are just making sure we go through the right hoops,
because front ofﬁce always tries to think of ways of avoiding these hoops.”
Interviewee 9 (Corporate Banker).
The splitting response encourages recruitment patterns which reinforce the functional divide, further increasing the
potential for cross-functional tension. Since 2012 Singaporean regulators have sought to control aggressive selling by
requiring all bankers and traders to be registered, with records being kept of those with ‘question marks’ over their per-
formance. It was observed that:
“This should be a deterrent, since hiring banks will check prospective employees against this record, and so it can affect a
banker's future job. But this is only effective for some bankers; the ‘powerful’ bankers are not affected by this. … The
‘powerful’ bankers say e so what? I have a ‘black’ mark, but it's due to some misunderstanding (they try to explain it away)
and, hey, I have this list of valuable clients that I bring withme. So these bankers are very powerful. Management doesn't want
to antagonize them, because if they leave the bank can lose as much as 10% of its business from just one banker. Then
management will look back at the regulations and say e ok, the regulations don't speciﬁcally say x, y, z. So compliance has to
work hard to convince management that the principles-based rules are actually not that ﬂexible, and we have to remind
management of the serious consequences of breaching these regulations.”Interviewee 13 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
We classify this regulatory response - namely, tightening the rules following the global ﬁnancial crisis - as an adaptation
response to the organisation paradox. The crisis highlighted the disconnect between remuneration systems and corporate
risk appetite (Kirkpatrick, 2009), so the regulations were adapted accordingly. Further regulations imposing Continuing
Professional Education (CPE) requirements on bankers also appear to have had limited impact:
“The regulators have now also put in place CPE hours for bankers, so these consulting ﬁrms also provide training to
train the bankers and get their required 15 hours of CPE per year. But in reality, they are signing up for all kinds of ‘soft’
courses, like how to communicate with your client, etc. just to comply with the 15 hours of CPE. This is pure form over
substance.”
Interviewee 13 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
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This suggests that the new rules, by providing public evidence of regulatory efforts to control the bankers and reduce risk
taking, are helping to legitimise the position of the regulators even though their practical impact on riskmanagement practice
within institutions remains open to question. In other words, the adaptation response is short term and, as suggested in the
literature, fails to eliminate the underlying paradox.
5.2. Performance paradox
Banks frequently respond to new regulations by revising their internal policies to adapt to a speciﬁc paradox, with one
particular example of such adaptation being mentioned by a signiﬁcant proportion of our interviewees. The Basel capital
regulations require banks to hold levels of capital that reﬂect the underlying risks of their business, but this directly impacts
on bank proﬁtability. Higher risk taking activities, such as trading, require higher capital reserves but, with capital being
expensive, banks respond accordingly:
“Actually there has been an attempt in (the bank) to make the balance sheet as lean as possible because it affects the
risk rating. So a lot has been taken off-balance sheet.”
Interviewee 12 (Product Controller).
Other interviewees suggested that the capital expense of high risk assets had also changed the products targeted for
selling.
“We are looking at how much revenue is brought in (that does not affect the balance sheet). We want a lot of cross-
selling, and prefer products that have very little balance sheet impact. Or if there is the same balance sheet impact,
we want much higher quality names.”
Interviewee 9 (Corporate Banker).
“The Basel capital rules and macro regulatory environment put a curb on trader risk-taking and made them more risk-
averse… in some banks, the support for Compliance is getting stronger. Structured products remain popular and are
now viewed as plain vanilla by bankers, largely because of the need to free up capital arising from tougher Basel capital
rules. The capital rules incentivize the bankers to do less capital intensive loan products, and more fee-based products
such as structured products.”
Interviewee 1 (Regulator).
The Turner Review in the UK concluded that inappropriate incentives may have encouraged the risk-taking that led to the
ﬁnancial crisis (FSA, 2009). Any shift in favour of lower risk products might, therefore, suggest that the regulators have
achieved their aims, although Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) found that problems of skewed incentive systems cannot be
resolved at the regulatory level, but are instead dependent on the nature of governance at the bank level. Our evidence
supports this latter, more complex picture, suggesting that banker behaviour remains driven by organisational incentives and
remuneration systems. In particular, we found examples where the bank compensation structure continues to look only at
returns, providing the front ofﬁce with an asymmetric payoff. The front ofﬁce receives bonuses if a risky trade pays off but
suffers no loss if it turns bad:
“Banker compensation is like an option, except that the front ofﬁce is paid a ‘premium’ in the form of a salary…. The
front ofﬁce is assessed solely on revenues with little accountability for bad debts.”
Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
It was also suggested that the desirability (to corporate bankers) of high risk loans has been exacerbated by IFRS 9, which
allows the full recognition of proﬁts on day one instead of over the tenure of the loan:
“Proﬁtability measurement drives behaviour. Loans are marked-to-market, and the credit spreads are recognized as
proﬁts at inception, instead of being amortized over the lives of the loans. The accounting methodology for loans
creates pressures on front ofﬁce to generate incremental revenues and justify the risk-adjusted assets. This induces the
generation of more loans to increase marked-to-market revenues.”
Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
The persistence of this type of remuneration system suggests that the splitting response to the regulatory demand for an
independent control function has simply resulted in credit risk being a limited consideration for the front ofﬁce, because
performance is measured on returns after adjusting for capital charges. Staff in the ﬁrst line of defence are, therefore, not
taking on the risk responsibilities that are assumed within the TLOD model to be a key part of their role.
In some banks, remuneration systemswere said to bemore holistic, linking a banker's remuneration to his/her compliance
record, but with limited effectiveness:
“Some banks have adopted the Balanced Scorecard approach, so that being ‘good’ and not having any brushes with
Compliance/regulators affects up to (say) 20% of the banker's bonus. But some banks don't really put much weight.
Even when the good behaviour counts for 20% of the bonus, the docking of the bonus doesn't have that much effect,
because the overriding thing is to meet the target. The bankers say e okay, I have a black mark and my bonus has been
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docked by $x, but I met my target, so I am paid an extra $y which makes the $x docked in my bonus ok. Overall, I am
better off by not keeping my slate clean, so long as I hit my target.”
Interviewee 13 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
This quote suggests that the system only works when the affected party has what the Americans would call “skin in the
game”. With little to lose, the incentive to comply is minimised and the payoff for the individual banker remains asymmetric.
“The bankers' view is e if it doesn't affect me personally; who cares? It happens to other people. The bankers are more
concerned about day-to-day pressure. Their sense of business (making money) is paramount and they have no sense of
ownership and of being responsible. But this is the way they have been trained and rewarded.”
Interviewee 13 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
Similar evidence that incentives drive behaviour more powerfully than the disincentives created by regulation is to be
found in the many comments we received on the development of what were termed “grey market practices”.
“We have different incentives. Front ofﬁce people look at bonuses e which are based on deals. Back ofﬁce people are
just making sure we go through the right hoops, because front ofﬁce always tries to think of ways of avoiding these
hoops.”
Interviewee 9 (Corporate Banker).
Grey market practices, or ways of avoiding the hoops, while not illegal, are certainly questionable. Traders were careful to
conform to policies relating to issues under the regulatory spotlight such as rate-ﬁxing and the selling of sub-prime products.
Nonetheless, there were reported instances of grey practices in the dealing roomwhich fell under the radar of regulators. For
example:
“Some traders are operating at the fringes of regulations in the trading of foreign currency options near expiry.”
Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
It would seem that as long as the returns for the client are good, then it is worth the bank pursuing the extra revenue and
allowing traders to do so. A comparable example, in a different context, was cited as follows:
“The credit risk system can be overridden to suit a desired credit score according to business requirements. A credit risk
report contains quantitative and qualitative factors. The quantitative component had ﬁxed risk weights based on ﬁrm
size, public versus private, and industry. Scores could be improved by adjusting the qualitative factors. At one stage, the
qualitative factorswere ignored due to a change in themodel to beat the Basel rules. This resulted in an improvement of
the score. However, the improved scores did not appear appropriate and had to be over-written. The over-write
resulted in exceptions being raised to management. Excessive exceptions to management would invite queries, thus
the model was reverted to retain the original qualitative factors.”
Interviewee 2 (Credit Risk Manager).
The existence of such gaming, combined with the anticipation and pre-empting of regulatory changes reﬂects the fact that
traders are incentivised to invent new products/trades that avoid the regulations. The grey practices are subtle and do not
represent explicit deviances from company policies (Westphal & Zajac, 2001) but the comment below suggests that they are
relatively common:
“There is a constant tussle between regulators and traders (regarding) moves to increase versus decrease product
transparency. Regulators try to impose exchange-traded conditions on OTC products. However, the level of complexity
is a function of people's ingenuity. Traders always come upwith evenmore complex products to avoid the regulations.”
Interviewee 3 (Regulator).
The evidence presented above suggests that institutional forces can drive the practices that employees adopt (termed
‘organisational imprinting’ by Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013) and in so doing they may exacerbate the divide between front
and back ofﬁce staff. Two comments illustrate the impact of regulatory pressure on organisational mind-sets:
“Very controls-focused, andmuch less business-focused. They went through a SOX audit 1.5 years ago, and some points
were brought up in the SOX audit for Product Control, so they are now very careful about ticking off these controls
boxes…. A lot of time is spent checking for compliance, and ticking off checklists, but there isn't enough analysing of
the state of affairs.”
Interviewee 12 (Product Controller).
“Breaches are severely dealt with becausemy ﬁrm has a zero tolerance attitude to infractions. My ﬁrm is concerned that
if the regulators single it out for ﬁnes or censure, its clients may terminate its services because it has been ‘caught out’.”
Interviewee 11 (Business Development Manager).
The requirement for back ofﬁce staff to control and ensure compliance in themidst of an environment inwhich front ofﬁce
staff are not inclined to cooperate leaves the control function, or second and third lines of defence, facing amajor challenge. In
their study of risk culture in ﬁnancial organisations, Power et al. (2014) posed the question “is the risk manager a policeman,
friend or critic of front ofﬁce staff”? This is a fundamental issue.
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Luscher and Lewis (2008) cite the example of managers who are required to be in charge but who simultaneously delegate
tasks as an example of the performance paradox, and we see a comparable paradox for risk managers in banks. The risk
managers’ primary role is to keep risks under control and to ensure compliance with external regulations, but they are not
directly in charge of the transactions that create the risks. In the context of the TLOD model, their role is to engender
behavioural changewithin the front ofﬁce and encourage bankers to take direct responsibility for riskmanagement. However,
the scope to achieve this is limited if, as our evidence suggests, regulatory arbitrage and internal remuneration systems are
actively discouraging such behaviour.
In seeking to change trader behaviour, a risk manager or product controller needs to be able to exercise some power over
the front ofﬁce staff, but this may be difﬁcult in practice. The front ofﬁce typically has more power than the back ofﬁce/risk
management function because of resource dependency which creates a coercive institutional pressure (Carpenter & Feroz,
2001):
“There is a relative hierarchye traders are top of the pile, followed by the risk and compliance guys. Back ofﬁce guys are
always answering up to sales and business people.”
Interviewee 9 (Corporate Banker).
The imbalance of power between internal controllers and front ofﬁce staff was clearly evident to PaulMoore, head of group
regulatory risk in HBOS from 2002 to 2005. In evidence to the UK's Treasury Select Committee, he observed that “being an
internal risk and compliance manager at the time felt a bit like being a man in a rowing boat trying to slow down an oil
tanker” (Jones, 2009: “TheMooreMemo”). In a review of the governance lessons to be learned from the global ﬁnancial crisis,
the OECD. (2009, p.12) noted that “the lower prestige and status of risk management staff vis-a-vis traders” played an
important role in preventing the control functions from exercising the critical scrutiny necessary for their role.
Our evidence suggests that the lack of authority granted to the risk control function to effectively challenge front line staff
is a direct consequence of the failure of the TLOD model to address the performance paradoxes faced by both the bank and
individual staff. If revenues are prioritised, then the front ofﬁce staff will dominate decision making, and risk and control
become an exercise in compliance rather than effective risk management. Furthermore, the performance paradox then gives
rise to belonging and learning paradoxes.
5.3. Belonging and learning paradoxes
A paradox of belonging is deﬁned as a situation in which individuals face a conﬂict between their personal and social
identities in the work place (Kreiner et al., 2006). Luscher and Lewis (2008) extend this deﬁnition by suggesting paradoxes of
belonging may also arise when staff are simultaneously members of groups with different social identities. Within ﬁnancial
institutions, as organisations become more multi-national with numerous reporting lines for each manager, the belonging
paradox generated by conﬂicting social identities becomes potentially more acutee do individuals favour the business unit or
the controlling function in the way they do their job? The conundrum is clearly delineated in the following observation:
“ Business unit controllers (e.g. product controllers) belong to the ﬁnancial controller function, and also support
directly the business unit managers. Business unit controllers have dual reporting lines and close links to both back
ofﬁce and front ofﬁce groups which could create conﬂicting goals.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
Business unit controllers face the challenge of potentially confusing and conﬂicting reporting lines. Their business unit
evaluates them on investment returns, yet in reporting to the ﬁnancial controller, the focus will be on risk management. A
business unit controller belongs simultaneously to the business unit team, the business control team and the ﬁnancial control
team, each of which may have differing social identities, mind-sets and perspectives. The same conﬂict of loyalties applies to
all risk managers, middle ofﬁce and back ofﬁce staff with reporting lines both to their back ofﬁce managers and the business
unit heads responsible for their performance evaluation.
The challenge for product controllers is further exacerbated by differences in the knowledge and information levels be-
tween front and back ofﬁces. Such knowledge gaps represent a learning paradox that arises out of a continually evolving
environment in which new products and regulations regularly appear:
“In one bank, the mechanics of CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) were not documented, and the back ofﬁce and
product controllers did not understand the product.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
If back ofﬁce staff do not understand the products being sold or traded by the bank, then they cannot effectively control the
associated risks. In Bear Stearns, Goldstein and Henry (2007) found that accountants conceded to traders in the valuation of
complex derivatives, even though the traders had created and/or sold the products. Similarly, in announcing a £5.6 million
ﬁne on Credit Suisse, for the mispricing of asset backed securities by traders, the FSA commented on the inability of risk
management staff to impose effective controls (FSA, 2008). The problem has, rather ironically, been aggravated by im-
provements in IT systems which have worked in favour of the traders, although IT has also helped risk management controls
in other respects.
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“Over the years, improvements in IT systems have enhanced risk management controls in some areas. For example,
primitive treasury systems in the past hindered proﬁt/loss reconciliations for split hedges, and marking to market of
foreign currency swaps. These old systems have been replaced by sophisticated Murex and Summit systems that
contain front ofﬁce to back ofﬁce modules, allowing straight through processing…. . However, such improvements in
technologies only lead to more complex products being developed. Complex products lead to complex systems which
create power differences between peoplewho knowand thosewho do not know the systems, and introduce signiﬁcant
unknown risks and uncertainties.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
Additionally, efforts to reduce costs by outsourcing basic ﬁnancial functions have also created new learning paradoxes and
increased risks.
“Financial reporting problems have been compounded by the outsourcing of proﬁt/loss production and reporting to
low-cost developing countries. The distance and communication barriers, coupled by differences inwork attitudes and
risk appetites create risks in the ﬁnancial reporting processes.”
Interviewee 12 (Product Controller).
Another example of inequality of understanding between front and back ofﬁce staff relates to the valuation of trades in
illiquid and complex products, which originate primarily from traders. Valuation quotes for illiquid productsmay come from a
single broker, making them subject to manipulation based on personal relationships between the trader and the broker and
the incentives promoted by the reward/compensation structure. Under the fair value accounting rules detailed in IFRS13,
when there is no active market a product's valuation must be marked to model i.e. based on observable market inputs and/or
recent market transactions. In the case of highly illiquid products, however, the availability of relevant input data may be very
limited. In practice, the valuation is ﬁrst determined by the traders before going through an independent price veriﬁcation
process by the product controllers. This process creates a learning paradox as the valuation is largely driven by the traders and
it is difﬁcult for product controllers to challenge or override the traders' valuation as the latter have more knowledge of the
products. Uncertainties in risk management come from risks of errors in model, input and parameter speciﬁcations, all areas
where the primary expertise lies with traders. Our interviewees identiﬁed a number of different ways inwhich the banks and
the compliance and control staff have responded to this paradox. At the organisational level, there is evidence of the
introduction of structured processes for the resolution of disputes between traders and controllers.
“In terms of structure, there is an escalation process for a valuation issue to be raised to the Head of Trading desk. In case
an issue has to be escalated to the Head of Global Markets, the Head of Product Control will talk to the Head of Global
Markets. For distressed prices, there is an internal forum to determine the prices to use (within a range from illiquid to
modelled prices), and the product controllers can defend their valuations by relying on prices approved by this forum.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
This adapting response from the bank recognises the paradox and seeks to provide a mechanism for its resolution by
increasing the power of the control function relative to the front ofﬁce. This can also be addressed by seeking support from
other risk management functions.
“Within the banks, product control can be supported by the market risk function in their control over the front ofﬁce. For
example, the product control and risk management teams worked together on the move to OIS (overnight index swap) rates
after the Libor ﬁxing issue. The risk management team is knowledgeable about market risks, although they lack an under-
standing of market nuances/practices.”Interviewee 6 (Internal Auditor).
Product controllers may seek to eliminate the learning paradox by increasing their personal expertise, to enable them to
challenge the traders more effectively:
“For example, I encountered a situation of short term hedges using Korean Treasury bill futures and learnt that valuation of
Treasury bills differs from bonds. I enrolled in aMasters of Applied Finance program to bridge this knowledge gap. I feel that a
product controller needs to use evidence and audit trails to support his/her number while discussing with traders. I carried
out an analysis of one-day $1m proﬁt in an equity derivative linked to the Tokyo index and convinced traders to accept a $1m
proﬁt reduction.”Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
Even if the theoretical knowledge gap can be mitigated by better training of back ofﬁce staff, the traders are still ahead of
the curve by virtue of their closeness to the business environment. The traders can claim to know the business and have more
relevant ‘market’ prices for product valuation in ﬁnancial reporting.
The third line of defencewithin the banks is the internal audit function, but it was suggested to us that staff here also faced
knowledge gaps, perhaps because they are more distanced from the businesses and so have greater difﬁculty in under-
standing the risks being taken.
“Internal auditors are in a difﬁcult position, because others refrain from teaching the internal auditors. The problem of a
lack of systems knowledge in auditors is more critical than the lack of product knowledge as the latter can be learnt
based on term sheets.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
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If product controllers and internal audit are limited in their capacity to challenge the traders, then it is possible that the
external auditors may be able to do so, but we were told that they too suffer from a knowledge gap.
“Auditors ﬁnd it difﬁcult to understand the complex systems of banks, and lack system knowledge. For example,
components of a structured product are processed via different systems. Auditors who have never implemented a bank
systemwill not understand the systems, black-boxes to them. Theymerely tick off reports. The IT auditors review access
security, but not data integrity.”
Interviewee 4 (Compliance Ofﬁcer).
The increasing dependence by external auditors on information provided by internal audit perhaps helps to compound
this learning paradox. If internal audit do not understand the product innovations then theywill not make external audit staff
aware of the issue, and the paradox escalates through the layers of defence. All of the above responses to a knowledge gap
indicate that there is acceptance of the presence of a learning paradox, and recognition of the need to adapt systems
accordingly. However, its ultimate persistence in the face of such recognition highlights an ongoing risk for the bank. Traders
appear to be capable of abusing their relative knowledge advantage and the TLOD model does not help to eliminate the
problem. Additionally, external auditors, who are not part of the TLOD, are suffering reductions in their jurisdictional
expertise (see Smith-Lacroix, Durocher, & Gendron, 2012; Woods, Humphrey, Dowd, & Liu, 2009) despite some suggestions
that they could provide a fourth line of defence (FSI, 2015).
6. Discussion and conclusion
The empirical evidence and analysis presented in this paper stands as a challenging assessment of the capabilities of a risk
management functionwithin the banking sector built on a regulatory driven (Basel, 1998) split between front and back ofﬁce
functions and the institutionalisation of what has come to be referred to as the TLOD model. Despite the heralded or, at least,
typically presumed value of apportioning riskmanagement responsibilities across different ‘lines of defence’, we ﬁnd that risk
management in banks is plagued by a number of underlying, connected paradoxes that challenge and potentially seriously
limit the capabilities and overall effectiveness of such a function.
The paradoxes originate at the organisational level and cascade down to the individual staff working in formal compliance
and control activities. They are exacerbated by fundamental differences in the perceptions and understanding of risks across
the front and back ofﬁces (Wahlstrom, 2009) which create tensions in their interactions. Whilst prior literature (Frigo &
Anderson, 2011; GAO, 2000; Power, 2009) has stressed the importance of ‘tone at the top’ and risk cultures, as factors
inﬂuencing the effectiveness of internal controls, our study demonstrates the need to look more closely at staff engagement
lower down the organisational hierarchy and their respective capability to facilitate and/or hinder the management of risk.
The TLODmodel of risk management, which deﬁnes front ofﬁce staff as the ﬁrst line of defence, appears to have been adopted
in principle but not in spirit. Front ofﬁce staff continue to engage in grey market practices and the gaming of regulations,
conﬁrming evidence from the literature that staff can, and will, ﬁnd ways to negate the constraints imposed by risk man-
agement systems (Bealing, 1994; House of Lords & House of Commons, 2013; MacLean & Benham, 2010; Sandholtz, 2012;
Westphal & Zajac, 2001).
Overall, whilst the TLOD model has formally spread responsibility for risk management across different organisational
lines, it has simultaneously failed to impact on institutional hierarchies which continue to place traders above risk and
compliance staff in terms of their presumed value to the organisation. Our ﬁndings clearly indicate that at the heart of the
relationship between the revenue generating and control functions lies a fundamental imbalance of power, characterised by
traders having both greater status and product knowledge. This ﬁnding echoes earlier commentaries on the banking sector
shortly after the outbreak of the global ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., see FSA, 2008; Jones, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Societe Generale,
2008). More recent studies have also been explicitly critical of the application of the TLOD model, with the UK Parliamentary
Commission's (House of Lords & House of Commons, 2013) report on banking standards, for example, highlighting both its
practical inability to disturb existing power structures and the misplaced operational emphasis on presenting a formal
appearance of awell-functioning riskmanagement that is not subjected to critical testing and assessment: “The “three lines of
defence” system for controlling risk has been adopted by many banks with the active encouragement of the regulators. It
appears to have promoted a wholly misplaced sense of security. Fashionable management school theory appears to have lent
undeserved credibility to some chaotic systems. Responsibilities have been blurred, accountability diluted, and ofﬁcers in risk,
compliance and internal audit have lacked the status to challenge front-line staff effectively. Much of the system became a
box-ticking exercise whereby processes were followed, but judgement was absent” (House of Lords & House of Commons,
2013, p.141).
Across the banking sector there appears to be a residing sentiment that if the ‘proper’ splits in risk management re-
sponsibilities could be secured and levels of independence and authority suitably established and respected, then risk
management systems will function well. A deeper level of reﬂection would point more towards conceptual rather than
operational failings. In this regard, our empirical evidence is strongly suggestive of the view that the functional splitting of risk
management responsibilities, when coupled with organisational recruitment, remuneration and performance management
systems that encourage revenue driven mind-sets in the front ofﬁce, appears operationally incapable of delivering a tightly
coordinated organisation risk management system. As such, the study lends considerable support to the suggestion that the
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regulatory demand for an independent risk function may actually “be a signiﬁcant barrier to an ambition to expand the risk
function footprint within the business” (Power et al., 2014).
Our evidence demonstrates that, in failing to resolve the core market-regulatory paradox (and just shifting it from the
broader organisational to the more speciﬁc personal level), functional splitting combined with the TLOD model has served to
reinforce the paradoxes and tensions that challenge, if not critically undermine, the effectiveness of risk management. We
therefore conclude that neither regulations nor the TLODmodel for bank risk management are as effective as somemight like
to believe. We conclude that there are strong analytical grounds for questioning the current adequacy of institutional re-
sponses to risk management failures in the banking sector and raising the real possibility that existing, regulatory and
industrially endorsed, models of risk management are fundamentally ﬂawed.
In closing, we acknowledge the limitations of our study, both in terms of the number of interviewees and the prominence
of interviewees working in risk and control, but believe that our paper offers important insights of general signiﬁcance across
the banking sector. There is still evident scope for further research to improve our understanding of the “key issues (that) are
played out at the interface between what are called the ﬁrst and second lines of defence (Power et al., 2014)”. However, and
most crucially, the paper's ﬁndings emphasise the importance of ensuring that future research in this area directly addresses
the core premises, concepts and belief systems on which a burgeoning risk management ‘empire’ has been built. Gendron
et al. (2016) have recently highlighted various ways by which risk management has been protected from systemic ques-
tioning, focusing particularly on the importance of assumptions regarding ‘risk reliability’. This study reinforces the impor-
tance of such thinking, by explicitly indicating that a collection of paradoxes lie at the core of risk management, the resolution
of which lie not in systems per se, but also personal interactions, beliefs and broader organisational workings. We look
forward to reading the insights of future researchers on such matters.
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